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ABSTRACT. Throughout colonization, Maori have been constantly urged to think 
of their terminology, and the objects it relates to, along constrained lines. In this 
practice, the self and other things are arguably restricted and impoverished. However, 
certain frequently used Maori terms – such as “whakapapa” and “whakaaro” – may 
be read alongside Heidegger’s “Ereignis,” revealing a completely other sense to them 
than their orthodox, respective translations of “genealogy” and “to think” allow. This 
kind of thinking in concert with an existential philosophy is an active process that 
allows for the “freeing up” of entities and a colonized group. With Heidegger’s 
assistance, the terms, and the original sources they refer to, reflect a kind of 
“Geviert”/Fourfold that ensures a continual strife and interplay between things in the 
world and self. 
 




In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger (1971) lamented humanity’s 
dominant way of thinking as having “long been accustomed to understate 
the nature of the thing” (p. 153), in which the thing is diminished so that, 
described as a particular entity through terminology, it must possess “per- 
ceptible properties.” This impoverishment in a basic relationship with the 
thing relates not only to thinking but also to the verb “to think” itself. Of 
course, here Heidegger was discussing the decline in thought in relation to 
humanity’s tendency to represent a bridge as a self-evident, solid construc- 
tion, rather than as an entity that gathers to it what he calls the “Fourfold” of 
sky, earth, divinities and mortals. Of vital importance is that we do not limit 
Heidegger’s critique solely to a focus on humanity’s representation of 
things but that we additionally undertake an inquiry into the concealment of 
Being as those things are revealed.  
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The focus on things to the detriment of such an ontological inquiry is, I 
argue, an insidious aspect of colonization. In an era where Maori, for 
instance, are set upon by a bewildering array of arguments to do with water 
rights, language revitalization, and proper political representation, the chance 
for an inquiry into Being is not only absent but probably also discouraged. 
Crucially, the ontological sense of Maori terms, which are meant to represent 
things in the world so that they are inherently related, is endangered. Two 
terms that I discuss in this chapter are “whakaaro” and “whakapapa.” Not 
only are they solidified individually as entities possessing a specific meaning, 
though; they are additionally segregated off as intrinsically unrelated to other 
terms, including each other. Against this human centered agency, Delamere 
had identified in traditional Maori philosophy that humans had much less 
control over “reo” (language): 
 
In the grander scheme of things, traditional Te Reo are the 
voices of nature; the jolt of an earthquake, the song of a bird, the 
rustling of leaves, the rumbling of thunder before a storm, the 
piercing bolt of lightning in the night sky, the rushing waves of a 
tsunami, the cry of a whale, the fresh smell of rain on the earth” 
(Milton 2011, p. 10). 
 
To this list of Delamere’s might be added the following: “…, the concern 
that thinking itself expresses as one is moved towards the draw of the 
world.” My addition assumes that language much more opens up aspects of 
the world, including thought, than it merely comprises soundwaves. If that 
addition is indeed permissible, then one may see a marked conviviality 
between Delamere’s proposal and that of Heidegger’s Fourfold, in which 
thinking is an active consideration of Being within the interplay of entities, 
in the sense that thinking is a responsive movement towards, and assuredly 
within, the world.  
Heidegger provides an antidote to the colonizing straightforward view 
of “whakapapa” and “whakaaro” as separate entities by providing certain 
ontological signposts, especially in his suggestion that humanity is “enowned” 
or “appropriated” by Being. Drawing on Heidegger’s philosophy about 
Ereignis (enowning), in the context of his writings on the Fourfold, I argue 
that both whakaaro and whakapapa contain to them, above all else, the 
sense of the disclosure of what is absent, and that they proclaim this more 
loudly than their individual meanings of “to think” and “genealogy” respec- 
tively. It is proposed that whakaaro and whakapapa signal a move back to 
the source of that enowning, and that there is therefore an intimacy between 





2. Heidegger’s “Ereignis,” or Enowning 
 
For Heidegger in his later work, Being is the central event to be thought by 
humanity, because, simultaneously while Dasein, as he calls humanity, is 
thrown into the world among things, Being withdraws itself. In his “Build- 
ing Dwelling Thinking,” Being as an event “owns” man by unfolding so 
that certain areas of concern are opened up for man. Being holds sway over 
humanity, and is the sense of existing poetically in the world amongst the 
interplay of phenomena. The phenomena he describes in the Fourfold – 
earth, sky, divinities, and mortals – are not separate, but entities that arise 
from a common unity. As we dwell, we are at home amongst the energetic, 
conflicting activities of these four. Being, unfolding as event, appropriates 
Dasein because it unfolds within him, and claims him, opens up for him 
what is significant. As the name for this event of unfolding, Being’s call for 
thinking is not one that is meant to be Gestell (enframing) in nature; it is 
instead to be the subject of poetic thinking as it “recedes into the depths 
beyond all relations” (Harman, 2009, p. 294). 
This sense of concealment is more significant for Heidegger – and is more 
urgent for thinking – than whatever is revealed. Things that are revealed are 
only disclosed because of Being’s withdrawal. To that extent, more important 
than man’s present state of visibility is how man’s being is highlighted by 
what is absent. It is this absence that highlights for an entity its present 
being. An example of this is the “movement of the leaf towards the sun” 
(Royal, 2005, p. 10), where the leaf is not yet fully formed. Royal positions 
this as an aspect of knowledge, where it may be thought of instead as an 
aspect of Being, in which what is absent dispenses an entity’s being by high- 
lighting what it is (Sheehan, 1998). This view of a thing’s essence being 
determined by what is anticipated is in opposition to a reliance on the pre- 
sently visible as independently possessed of its own essence. A thing is 
cleared as visible within a world, for instance – and one must here retain an 
“openness for things to emerge” (Joronen, 2013, p. 629) – but this occurs in 
the context of a world as a whole, in which the thing is not a thing in its 
own right. 
The unfolding that is Being is immediately suggestive of movement. That 
Being unfolds and enowns entities, including man, should imply that there 
is a kind of movement occurring. The anticipation towards what is not yet 
realized is this movement (Sheehan, 1998); the “draw” of Being, as it 
withdraws, brings the concern of Dasein towards it. As Heidegger notes “all 
revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. But that which frees 
– the mystery – is concealed and always concealing itself” (Heidegger, 1978, 
p. 306). Dasein’s own movement, the becoming of humanity, is towards 
death. Dasein is present because of the absence of its death, towards which 
Dasein is moving. The aim of Dasein, for Heidegger, is to interrogate Being 
 51 
and, at the same time, to be thankful (which is to be thoughtful as well) to 
Being for giving things their presence through its withdrawal. 
Thinking has its source in enowning in that man resides within the four- 
fold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals. In this relationship, Being withdraws 
to reveal the oneness of the relationship between the four, and to provide for 
thinking into that mystery. Here we can see the relationship between the 
Fourfold and the active process of thinking, in which thinking is given to 
humanity to consider the source, or Being. In responding, humanity shows 
that this gift is not one way; as it issues the call for thought, Being is already 
dependent on a response from humanity (Schalow & Denker, 2010). Thus 
thinking is already there in the call that enowning issues for Being, and in 
that relationship neither thinking nor Being are subservient to the other. The 
Fourfold is an illumination of that world for thinking; its constituents are 
not, therefore, meant to be read as wholly concrete, physical entities, as they 
also call for thought into the concealment of Being and into man’s capacity 
to think itself. 
 
3. The Relationship between whakapapa and whakaaro  
    through Heidegger’s Fourfold 
 
Heidegger’s Fourfold does not figure frequently in accounts about his work, 
suggesting that there is either something uncomfortable or unsustainable in 
it. Whether his more poetic language in his later works may indeed be 
called “philosophy” as such is the subject of some debate. Plebuch (2010), a 
writer on Heidegger’s Fourfold, recounts that he himself has been informed 
“that the later Heidegger is more mysticism than philosophy” (p. 5), adding 
that “[w]hat, precisely, they mean by ‘mysticism’ has never been entirely 
clear to me.” I agree with Plebuch’s questioning of the term here, and am 
interested in the discomfort provoked by Heideggerean calls for thinking 
about Being, although I do not have the scope at this stage to track and 
describe it fully. What may be said quite affirmatively is that, traditionally, 
Maori had no concept for “mysticism” as such; a concept or entity could be 
“huna,” or “hidden,” but this term hardly carries with it the tinge of the 
pejorative that “mystical” does in Western philosophical discourse. Moreover, 
theorizing about what gives rise to entities for Maori cannot help but bring 
to the fore a mystical account, even when Maori themselves would not 
immediately think of the discussion as mystical. That Heidegger’s Fourfold 
“provides a way of seeing magic in the everyday” (Lang, 2013, p. 330) but 
that it may indeed on that basis be a shortfall is, for Maori, a perplexing 
prospect, as the magical and the pragmatic are at once the same.  
Fascinating discussions about cultural attitudes towards mysticism aside, 
Heidegger’s Fourfold provides impetuses towards thinking about both whaka- 
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papa and whakaaro in different ways. He reveals that genuine thinking is 
linked to an authentic experience of being in the world, which, I argue later, 
may be represented through the Maori term “whakapapa.” For him, “to 
dwell” is linked to the verb “to be,” and so to belong on the earth is to dwell 
among what Maori might call “te taiao” (which includes the invisible ele- 
ments of those things that can be seen). He notes that: “It is language that 
tells us about the nature of a thing, provided that we respect language’s own 
nature. In the meantime, to be sure, there rages around an unbridled yet 
clever talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though 
he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains 
the master of man. Perhaps it is before all else man’s subversion of this 
relation of dominance that drives his nature into alienation. That we retain a 
concern for care in speaking is all to the good, but it is of no help to us as 
long as language still serves us even then only as a means of expression” 
(Heidegger, 1971, p. 146). Whilst he does not address “thinking” in those 
sentences, we can nevertheless identify that thinking is commonly turned 
over to a human-centered, autonomous exercise. Thinking itself is less 
important in the current discourse than “knowledge” with the result that the 
active process of reflection is buried in the first instance. To add insult to 
that injury, thinking is misrepresented as an internal function. According to 
Heidegger, though, thinking is given to man, instead of emanating from man 
as its source.  
Thus the term “think” is not a suitable translation for “whakaaro.” The 
translation falls short of the true comportment towards things in the world, 
including their absence, that “whakaaro” draws our attention to. In a Maori 
sense, both body and the thing being focused on are results of an activity 
that is not explicable through the common, economical verb “to think.” Smith 
(2000) asserts that whakaaro means “to cast attention to” (p. 58), which he 
places as an “activity of the stomach and the entrails.” He continues “the 
stomach is associated with the ira tangata aspect or earthly component of 
that which forms the basis of action.” It is not, however, “the actual process 
of rational thought” (p. 58) but a concerned inclination towards the world 
that whakaaro heralds. 
That the issue is one to do with language concerns the later Heidegger 
(1999), when he states, against the view that language is available for lin- 
guistic study, that “[l]anguage is the house of Being” (p. 239). About lan- 
guage, Pohatu (n.d.) has this to say: “Kai te reo ōna ake whakaaro e puputia 
ai ngā take pū Māori” (p. 2). 
Even a conventional reading of this assertion would render it as suggest- 
ing that language has its own thinking such that issues that are important to 
Maori are given expression. This is certainly true of language; it does have 
its own voice that cloaks things in the world. Even silence, an absence of 
words, will cloak those things, and whakaaro, as an orientation towards 
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things, does not need words to give it validity. But what does whakaaro 
mean in this assertion? If issues for Maori are to be cloaked with words or 
silence, then whakaaro must be a mode of orientation towards those issues 
in the first instance. Words and silence have their own way of drawing a 
person’s thoughts towards things, not necessarily through what they point to 
as visible but what is not immediately before the self. It is here that we see 
“whakapapa” as a crucial evocation of Being. 
For Maori, there appear to be two philosophical paths to take as far as an 
ontological thinking of the term “whakapapa” goes: it can either be proposed 
as a progression of names on a framework (even if the names are signif- 
icant), or, instead, it can be thought of as a means of an inquiry into Being. 
A third, more difficult, alternative may yet exist, however, consisting in an 
inquiry into the progression of names as a call to think about Being, in 
conjunction with the “sense” that whakapapa offers. Extremely important to 
many Maori is the knowledge and recital of those names, but the challenge 
in a colonized context is, in line with Heidegger’s thinking, to inquire into 
the call of those who we continuously become through our concern with our 
own mortality. This interrogation calls for us to listen to the more secret but 
insistent senses of the term “whakapapa,” either quite apart from, or along- 
side, its common meaning.  
For those not familiar with the Maori language, it may be helpful at this 
point to express in short form two dominant meanings of the term “whaka- 
papa,” and then to consider the term in its separate components in an equally 
brief way, before thinking through the term’s hidden nature on the basis of 
those meanings. Whakapapa can mean: 
 
-genealogy 
-to layer (in a physical sense). 
 
Taken as two of its components, the term can evoke: 
 
-to become (“whaka”) earth (“papa”)/be embraced towards Papa (mother 
earth) 
-to cause to become (“whaka”) earth (“papa”). 
 
Both sets of meanings – the common and the more obscure – are equally as 
helpful in one’s rethinking of the term. Heidegger might have called the 
first two – genealogy and to layer, in particular genealogy – “calculative” 
because they are bordered off within a prescribed horizon of thinking of the 
highly visible. The latter two, more fully explained, are more meditative or 
poetic because they rely on much more on what Novalis called “the active 
association of ideas – on the self-active, purposeful, and idealistic produc- 
tion of chance – (fortuitous – free concatenation)” (Wood, 2007, p. 168). In 
other words, on their own they do not amount to much, but in conjunction 
with active thinking they may be allowed to assume a life of their own. 
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In his book What Is Called Thinking? Heidegger (1968) remarked that 
“Man can think in the sense that he possesses the possibility to do so. This 
possibility alone, however, is no guarantee to use that we are capable of 
thinking. For we are capable of doing only what we are inclined to do. And 
again, we truly incline only toward something that in turn inclines toward 
us, toward our essential being, by appealing to our essential being as the 
keeper who holds us in our essential being” (p. 3). These few lines could 
spur the Maori writer on towards greater thought, even at the individual 
points at which he uses certain terms. For instance: how is thinking reliant 
on being inclined towards something. How does a thing incline towards us? 
How are we “essential” in the sense that there is something that endures 
throughout whatever we think? And what “keeps” us in a Maori way? 
 
4. “Becoming” as a Form of Enowning within  
    the Fourfold of Earth, Sky, Divinities and Mortals 
 
Whakapapa, read in light of its layering nuance, enables us to think of 
things in the world as constantly moving. Although this layering might be 
expressed as referring to a physical movement, it is not limited to what is 
present. Heidegger began his questioning into the notion of the Fourfold with 
an apparently concrete idea of a phenomenon called “earth,” although, as 
we shall see, to read earth as a solid entity is to misinterpret him: “Earth is 
the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, 
rising up into plant and animal” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 149). 
Earth here is a metaphor for experienced world as much as it is a physical 
event. Whakapapa, thought about poetically, portrays both also. As things in 
the world become “whaka” earth “papa,” they are committed to the task of 
being collected within the world, and also its mystery. In that gathering in 
which the world comes to be what it is (Rose, 2012), they are immediately 
moved towards the earth. Papa, the earth mother, is the hidden aspect of 
“whenua” (land), resulting in man’s sense-making of what it is to be within 
the world. But, vitally, Papa has withdrawn and it is this concealment that is 
important for man, because it has allowed the disclosure of the earth in the 
first instance. Hence, “whakapapa” is the constant draw that is exerted on 
man, where man is pulled continuously back to the earth but never quite to 
Papa herself. Man is moved towards Papa, and is hence maintained in relation 
to it, complete with man’s concern for reaching some form of finality. In 
“becoming” earth as Being, however, one never reaches that determined 
state. In a more abstract fashion, it might be said that, for Maori, one’s point 
of concern is never completely reached, nor is one’s thinking entirely grounded 
in certainty. Instead, one’s thinking is called by a ground (“papa”) that we 
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widely believe to be solid and rationally “antecedent” (Rose, 2012, p. 758) 
but that perception never reaches. 
Whakapapa dictates that whakaaro is always to be a continuing activity 
into the nature of Being. They are interwoven terms that call for an inquiry 
into Being by virtue of the deeper recesses of what they evoke. Whakaaro is 
not, first and foremost, “to think.” Importantly, as much as whakapapa 
insists, it is a constant movement within the world, but man is moved by the 
interplay of the world, and by its mystery, rather more than self-control will 
allow. An illustration is necessary here: when one states “kei te whakaaro 
au mo taku whenua,” what is really the ontological sense of this activity 
may be this: “I am being moved towards a state of concern about my land, 
and at the same time what has given my land its presence.” The sense of 
becoming that is inherent to the prefix “whaka” in whakaaro is of utmost 
importance here because it places the self at the mercy of the greater inter- 
relationship of things in the world. Therefore I am not just deciding to think 
autonomously about my land; I am becoming regardful of my land through 
the pathway that the withdrawal of Being provides. Furthermore, the bringing 
to my concern a phenomenon does not foresee that I shall be able to alight 
onto that phenomenon tidily and finally. 
Listening to the sense of “whakapapa,” we can consider “papa” as an 
overall process of thinking that includes not just earth but other entities, 
such as sky, divinities, and mortality, as Heidegger had noted. When man 
thinks, one is collected and is guided along the path between those entities, 
for “papa,” as the precursor of humanity, also brings with it “rangi,” or sky. 
One is hence attuned (another meaning of “rangi”) towards the movement of 
“vaulting path of the sun, the course of the changing moon, the wandering 
glitter of the stars, the year’s seasons and their changes, the light and dusk 
of day, the gloom and glow of night, the clemency and inclemency of the 
weather” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 149). Thinking is an immediate acknowledge- 
ment of that attunement even when the sky is not thought of, or when it is 
absent. As a derivative of “Papatuanuku,” or “rock foundation beyond ex- 
panse” (Marsden, 2003, p. 22), earth’s spreading out through rock and water 
is deeply concerned with the sky. Moreover, Maori creation narrative has it 
that Rangi and Papa were once inseparable. Despite their eventual parting, 
they retain to each other elements of the other. 
In his poem “We, who live in darkness,” Tuwhare (n.d.) tells of the 
potency of the night: “Black intensities/of black on black on black feeding 
on itself.” 
He was drawn to that absence that underlies the night as much as Marsden 
was. Poetry resonates with the absence and is probably the most appropriate 
medium of thinking, as it does not prefer the visible object as instrumental 
language does. But what is important in these lines is not merely a retelling 
of creation; instead, the draw towards thinking about nothingness is iden- 
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tified. It is the absent that Tuwhare has thought about. The void that he 
dwells on here is a precursor to the light: 
 
Eyes I never knew I possessed 
Were stunned by it. 
Forcing me to hide my face in the earth. 
It was light, my brothers. 
 
Sky here is vital as a tilt for humanity towards the absence, in its relation- 
ship with earth. It is plain that what is resisted is the darkness, but darkness 
is meant to represent more here than just complete nothingness. It is darkness 
because of the absence of light. Later, light is light because of the absence 
of darkness; yet, darkness still holds man in its thrall even when there is 
light, precisely because there is light. Hiding one’s face in the earth – in a 
sense, returning to the earth, or heeding both the sky’s and the earth’s call – 
one is returned to the darkness even amongst the light. The discomfort light 
causes calls man’s attention yet again to what is absent – darkness.  
What remains concealed is what draws humanity’s attention to it. To re- 
turn to the activity of becoming: one becomes (whaka) by being predisposed 
towards the world. The history of the thing in the world, and other things in 
their relationships with each other, all turn the attention of the self towards 
something or other, or, as I have proposed, towards the hidden or the nothing. 
Royal points out that the term “aro” is related the front sensory field of the 
perceiver. I consider that one is then amongst the world and that one, at 
times, apprehends aspects of the world. However, what is paramount here is 
the nature of the self as an entity among others, not as a transcendent, 
autonomous entity. The Heideggerean sky, in conjunction with the earth, and 
in its reading together with earth as “the concealed nature of Being within the 
world,” proposes that one’s visible sphere is dispensed by that concealment. 
Maori know well the relationship of the divinities or atua to the sky and 
earth, including the link between them both that atua provided. Heidegger 
(1971) notes here, “The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the god- 
head. Out of the holy sway of the godhead, the god appears in his presence 
or withdraws into his concealment” (p. 150). “Atua” can mean “divinities” 
but the term carries with it the additional sense of “of the beyond” (a-tua). 
Gods for Maori are actually those that do not reveal themselves, in their 
totality, as solid entities but remain beyond the senses even when they are 
present. That is, they are considered to be “there” (in the sense of “ira,” which 
can refer to “essence,” a surprised “over-thereness!,” or even “genetic in- 
heritance”) but in their presence there is concealedness, or “beyondness” to 
their nature. To think in the presence of the divinities is simply to acknowl- 
edge their mystery, along with that of the earth and the sky. As for whaka- 
papa, we can return to the interpretation of “whaka” to mean “to become” 
and “papa” as a reference to “Papatuanuku,” one of the atua involved with 
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continual human nourishment. As we saw in “Earth” above, in becoming 
apparently solid, Papatuanuku herself remains concealed, because she allows 
herself to move towards human perception but never quite reveals her full 
self. When man thinks of this process, he moves within her presence but 
never gets so detached as to see her in her entire visibility. Here, whakaaro 
means more than simply a gift of thinking by the divine, and hence a 
striving after communion that Being demands of mankind; it is instead a 
continual activity that occurs within the concern that man has to answer the 
perpetual call of Being, with whakapapa standing alongside whakaaro as an 
impetus for thinking about what is not perceptible. “Whakaaro” does not, 
then, open up opportunities for man to “be at one,” as it were, with Being, 
but instead depicts the response of humanity to the enowning process. 
In respect of language that refers to the divinities and their withdrawal, 
Heidegger (1968) noted that “[w]hat withdraws from us, draws us along by 
its very withdrawal” (p. 9). In Maori, a facet of that withdrawal could be 
termed “ngaro,” although Marsden avers that this void, after metaphysics, is 
called “kore.” Whatever is not a thing, therefore, orients man towards it, 
makes man consider it. Marsden (2003) proposed that “kore” assumed so 
much of its nothingness that it became “korekore,” which is so much absent 
that it is present. This contradiction is not just a metaphysical one, although 
it does remain metaphysical; it is also quotidian. One is inclined towards the 
“nothing” of a thing, and this is precisely what gains our concern. Moreover, 
the nothingness of the interplay of all things gains our concern, not just the 
thing in its isolation. When man is engaged in whakaaro, one is at the whim, 
to a certain extent, of the unpredictable nature of the seen and unseen aspects 
of the world, meaning that one is thinkingly in the thrall of Being. 
Heidegger (1971) identifies that humanity is preoccupied with its eventual 
demise. He states that “The mortals are the human beings. They are called 
mortals because they can die. To die means to be capable of death as death. 
Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains on earth, 
under the sky, before the divinities” (p. 150). Man’s mortality, therefore, 
involves reflecting the earth, sky and divinities at the same time through 
considering, as a finite entity, the “plenitude of possible worlds in which I am 
not” (Wheeler, 2011, n.p.). Dwelling in the Fourfold requires that one not 
only acknowledge the unitary nature of what is illuminated through poetic 
thought but also the deep rift in thinking that occurs when one realizes the 
extent and mystery of other worlds in which one is not located.  
Heidegger’s idea of mortality in the Fourfold calls us to think about the 
absence of our presence in other possibilities, in a Maori way. The role of 
memory as a connection to the past and future, for Maori, perhaps highlights 
this best. Heidegger (1968) states that “memory” (what Maori term “mau- 
mahara”) is the gathering (“mau”) of thought (“mahara”). When one thinks 
in the field of another utterance, one is being gathered to think by that utter- 
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ance, as much as one is autonomously gathering oneself to think. To that 
extent, thinking is a certain kind of bringing together, in the sense that man 
is collected, cognitively and emotionally, towards the mystery of the absent. 
Man retains in their essence the thinking of the utterer and responds – this is 
perhaps a sort of memory. Yet whatever is not present about the utterance, 
and indeed whatever is not present in general, notwithstanding the utterance, 
may be more poignant for thinking than what is present and what is heard, 
or the utterance. 
Memory, as a gathering of thinking, is often thought of as a rarefied 
entity:  
 
Memory – from Latin memor, mindful – has in mind something 
that is in the mind, thought. But when it is the name of the 
Mother of the Muses, ‘Memory’ does not mean just any thought 
of anything that can be thought. Memory is the gathering and 
convergence of thought upon what everywhere demands to be 
thought about first of all. Memory is the gathering of recollection, 
thinking back. It safely keeps and keeps concealed within it that 
to which at each given time thought must be given before all 
else, in everything that essentially is, everything that appeals to 
us as what has being and has been in being. Memory, Mother of 
the Muses – the thinking back to what is to be thought is the 
source and ground of poesy. This is why poesy is the water that 
at time flows backward toward the source, toward thinking as a 
thinking back, a recollection (Heidegger, 1968, p. 11).  
 
The silence of what must be thought about, due to its absence, is what is 
loudest in thinking; what wells up is what is to be thought about through its 
concealment to man. The thinking of an ancestor (“tu-puna”), then, is that 
aspect of an ancestor that wells (“puna”) up before us. Hence an ancestor is 
always on the way to meeting us in our thinking, as much as having existed 
in the past. In thinking, we meet that ancestor to some extent as they rise 
before us, are part of their world and yet are not fully accommodated within 
it. One’s mortality in a Maori sense, then, at least partially revolves around 




An interesting facet of any discussion about either “whakapapa” or “whaka- 
aro” is that, on their own, they could be considered within the horizon of 
any one of the elements of the Fourfold and yet would have to allude to the 
other, even unnamed, elements in that same analysis. I argue that this is 
Heidegger’s intention – to retain the substance of the other elements at the 
same time. Further, I would posit that neither whakapapa nor whakaaro can 
be discarded in Maori metaphysical discourse as they show both human 
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agency and mystery at the same time. Thus, what “keeps” us in a Maori 
way, to answer Heidegger’s question, is that mysterious interplay of things 
in the world, including what gives rise to those things. This “wana,” or 
continual awe at things, is what underlies both thinking and “gathering” that 
whakaaro and whakapapa respectively call for.  
 
Glossary of Maori terms 
 
aro    regard 
atua    god; of beyond 
huna   hidden; concealed 
ira    gene; interjectory (over there) 
ira tangata  human gene 
kore   metaphysical nothingness 
korekore  overwhelming metaphysical nothingness 
mahara   thought 
mau   gather to; hold onto 
maumahara  to remember 
ngaro   disappear 
papa   earth (abbreviation of Papatuanuku) 
Papatuanuku earth mother 
puna   spring 
Rangi/rangi sky father (complete form: Ranginui)/sky 
taiao   environment 
tupuna   ancestor 
wana   awe 
whaka   to cause; to become (less conventional) 
whakaaro  to think (conventional) 
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